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Abstract:  While several cross-sectional studies (La Porta et. al. 2002, Norton 2002) 
examine institutional and cultural determinants of economic freedom, changes in 
economic freedom remain unexamined.  I find changes in voter preferences for economic 
freedom to be a significant determinant of changes in economic freedom in a panel of 25 
OECD countries.  The voter preference measure is robust to several alternative 
specifications, including the addition of institutional variables. 
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I.  Introduction1 
 
 It is difficult to overstate the importance of economic freedom.  The system of 
natural liberty arising from man’s propensity to truck, barter and trade has been lauded 
since the days of Smith.  Recently, indices produced by the Fraser Institute and the 
Heritage Institute have allowed for empirical testing of the consequences of economic 
freedom.  The results are striking.  Gwartney, Lawson and Holcombe (1999) find 
economic freedom increases economic growth, even after correcting for demographics 
and human and physical capital.  Sturm and de Haan (2000a, 2001) find increases in 
economic freedom lead to increases in economic growth.  Grubel (1998) finds strong 
correlations between economic freedom and per capita GDP, economic growth, 
employment, human development, life expectancy, literacy and abatement of poverty.  
De Soto (2000) finds that the underdevelopment of the third world can largely be 
ascribed to a lack of enforceable, tradable private property right – the absence of 
economic freedom.  In addition to confirming some of the findings listed above, Dawson 
(1998) argues that economic freedom correlates strongly with other types of freedom.  
While the literature exploring the consequences of economic freedom continues to 
develop, it does not seem premature to conclude that economic freedom can be 
considered desirable on a variety of consequentialist dimensions, regardless of one’s 
assessment of rights-based arguments concerning private property. 
 The literature exploring the determinants of economic freedom is far more 
nascent, however.  De Haan and Sturm (2000b) argue that increases in measures of 
                                                 
1 Eric Crampton is a doctoral candidate at George Mason University.  The author thanks Bryan Caplan and 
two anonymous referees for useful comments and suggestions.  The author is grateful for financial support 
from the Bradley Foundation. 
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democracy predict increases in economic freedom in developing countries.  Heckelman 
(2000) finds that economic growth may precede the “government intervention” 
component of the Heritage Foundation’s economic freedom index, but that, on the whole, 
economic freedom precedes growth.  La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleeches and 
Shleifer (2002) find English forms of judicial independence and common law structures 
correlate with higher economic freedom.  Norton (2002) finds that cultural variables, 
including religion, ethnicity and linguistic background, are important determinants of 
economic freedom.  Specifically, he finds that the strength of a country’s property rights 
is increasing in the proportion of people of Protestant faith, decreasing in the proportion 
of people of Islamic faith, and increasing in linguistic and ethnic homogeneity.   
Determinants of changes in a country’s level of economic freedom remain 
relatively unexplored, and completely unexplored for developed countries.  De Haan and 
Sturm restrict their analysis to developing countries, while La Porta et al. and Norton use 
cross-sectional analysis in their work.  This paper explores changes in economic freedom 
in the OECD as a function of an obvious, but heretofore neglected, variable; namely, 
changes in voter preferences for economic freedom.  The exploration here is preliminary 
in nature, but nevertheless provides reasonably strong conclusions.  Changes in voter 
preferences for economic freedom correlate strongly with changes in economic freedom 
in the developed world. 
II.  Data 
 
 This paper seeks to examine changes in levels of economic freedom over time in 
the developed world.  While several measures of economic freedom are used in the 
literature, only the Fraser Institute economic freedom index (Gwartney and Lawson, 
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2001) provides time series data over a sufficient range of dates to make feasible an 
empirical examination of determinants of change over time.2  Caudill et. al. (2000) use 
principal component analysis to find that the available measures of economic freedom 
track approximately equally well; as such, we here use the measure providing the longest 
time series.  The Fraser Institute measure scores countries on several component 
measures that are aggregated to provide an index measure of economic freedom at five-
year intervals beginning in 1970.  The most recent dataset provides seven observations 
per country, and consequently six observations of changes in economic freedom.  The 
Fraser Institute Economic Freedom Index is now fairly commonly used in the literature 
(see Ali (1997); Easton and Walker (1997), for example); its construction here will not be 
discussed in depth.  In short, the index assigns countries a score ranging from 1 to 10, 
based on the burden of inflation, regulation, taxation, and impediments to currency 
exchange, with 10 representing the highest level of economic freedom.  Meriting greater 
discussion is the measure of median voter preference. 
 Panel analysis of the effect of voter preferences on policy outcomes is made 
difficult by the lack of a measure of voter preferences that is comparable both across 
countries and over a time series.  Survey data often provides reasonable cross-sectional 
measures of voter preferences, or good time-series within particular countries, but rarely 
constructs cross-national time series.  The lack of good data is understandable – 
accumulating survey data is very costly, especially when attempting to ensure questions 
are worded in such a way that the answers will be comparable across different language 
communities.   
                                                 
2 The Heritage Institute measure provides annual observations, but beginning only in 1995. 
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 To avoid these difficulties, this paper makes use of an alternate, and relatively 
unexplored, data source on voter preferences.  Political parties issue policy manifestos or 
policy position papers in the lead-up to elections in most democracies.  The Manifesto 
Research Group (Budge et. al, 2001) codes political party manifestos using a salience 
measure: the proportion of statements in each party manifesto corresponding to any one 
of fifty-six common issue dimensions.  Given a limited amount of space in manifestos 
and a limited voter attention span, parties will place heaviest emphasis on those issues 
that they feel will resonate most strongly with voters.3  The MRG dataset includes 25 
democracies (see Appendix for full list) in the post-war period.  
 The above data provides a measure of relative party emphasis rather than of 
absolute party position.  Parties placing the same emphasis on an issue, and consequently 
showing the same scoring in the Manifesto Research Group’s measure, may nevertheless 
hold opposite positions on that issue.  Proponents of salience coding argue that many 
issues are effectively unidirectional (Budge 1992, 1999); a political party that places little 
weight on environmental concerns, for example, will simply not spend much time 
discussing environmental issues rather than spending a great deal of effort explaining 
why we shouldn’t care about the environment.  And, referring to the list of issue 
categories in the appendix, the most obviously bipolar issues are accorded two categories 
in the data set: positive and negative.4   
By grouping issue-categories together, a political party’s positional stance can be 
extracted.  Laver and Budge (1992, 1993) combine exploratory factor analysis and a 
                                                 
3 A full list of issue categories is included in the appendix. 
4 Laver and Garry (2000) suggest the use of an alternative coding mechanisms to determine relative party 
policy positioning.  However, data has not yet been compiled using the new proposed position-based 
coding.   
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priori reasoning to determine issue categories that can be grouped to construct a net 
measure of right/left party position.  The sum of pro-Right issue categories is subtracted 
from the sum of pro-Left issue categories.5  So, a purely left-wing party manifesto will 
earn a score of 100 while a purely right-wing manifesto will earn a score of -100.  Laver 
and Budge find that their measures track other measures of party right/left positioning in 
a range of countries.  Kim and Fording (1998, 2001a, 2001b) extend this analysis.  They 
find that manifesto-based party ideology scores correlate strongly with the “expert 
assessment” of party positioning developed by Castles and Mair (1984) and with 
Eurobarometer measures of popular assessments of party ideology.  We have good reason 
to believe, then, that manifesto-based party ideology scoring provides a reasonable proxy 
for party ideology. 
We can construct a reasonable proxy for median voter left-right policy 
preferences by simply combining electoral returns with party left-right policy position 
data under fairly reasonable assumptions.  First, voters must be able to identify a left-
right continuum and be able to place themselves on that continuum.  Second, left-right 
ideology must be an important part of individual voting decisions.  Third, the components 
of “right” and “left” ideologies must be consistent across countries.  Kim and Fording 
(1998) show that these assumptions are consistent with the relevant literature.6 
                                                 
5 Kim and Fording (1998) follow a slightly different procedure from Laver and Budge (1992, 1993): they 
use the formula [ (Left-Right) / (Left+Right) ].  I follow Laver and Budge in using a difference measure; 
subsequent analysis will test both measures.  Kim and Fording report that their measure correlates with the 
Laver-Budge measure at 0.95; I expect that results using the revised measure will not change greatly. 
6 Kim and Fording also assume sincere voting.  They augment their measure to account for strategic voting 
and find that the augmented measure correlates with the original measure at 0.99; strategic voting should 
not greatly affect the median voter positions derived using their procedure. 
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Kim and Fording calculate the median voter position as follows: M = L + {(50-
C)/F}*W.7 The resulting measure of median voter left-right positioning, they argue, 
conforms to conventional wisdom about differences in ideology between parties and 
across time, and correlates with other measures used in the literature.  They find that their 
measure of median voter ideology correlates strongly with other measures of mass 
ideology, including Eurobarometer scores and Stimson’s (1991) measure of American 
policy mood.  Stevenson (2001) uses the Kim and Fording measure, among other proxies 
for voter ideology, in work assessing shifts in popular ideology.  He finds that analysis 
based on the Kim and Fording data provides results quite similar to that based on other 
measures of popular ideology. 
The Kim and Fording measure provides a reasonable proxy for voter right-left 
preferences.  I use this measure as the basis for my measure of voter support for 
economic freedom.  I separate the right-left index into those components that a priori 
seem relevant to economic freedom and those that do not.  Categories relevant to 
economic freedom include: free enterprise, incentives, protectionism: negative, economic 
orthodoxy, welfare state reduction, market regulation, economic planning, protectionism: 
positive, controlled economy, welfare state expansion, and nationalization.  I construct a 
measure of net platform support for economic freedom by subtracting the percentage of 
anti-economic freedom statements from the percentage of pro-economic freedom 
                                                 
7 Where M = Median voter position; L = Lower end of the interval containing the median; C = Cumulative 
frequency (vote share) up to but not including the interval containing the median; F = Frequency in the 
interval containing the median; W = Width of the interval containing the median.   
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statements.  I then calculate median voter positions over the right-left index, the 
“economic freedom” right-left index, and the “non-economic” right left index.8   
As noted earlier, the Economic Freedom Index (EFI) provides measures of 
economic freedom taken at five-year intervals.  Average median voter positions9 over the 
five years prior to an EFI measurement were constructed.  While alternate weighting 
schemes were contemplated to discount voter preference measurements from the earlier 
parts of the five-year intervals, such efforts seemed likely to yield curve-fitting and 
unreliable results.  Differences in political institutions across countries may lead to 
differences in the speed of policy response to changes in voter preferences.  While 
varying lag structures would provide one means of correcting the problem, such measures 
would be rather ad hoc; controls for differing political institutions and country fixed 
effect estimation may provide a better solution.  Average median voter position over the 
interval between EFI measurements seemed the most natural measure of voter preference 
as was retained for use in this analysis. 
Since changes in economic freedom are the subject of this investigation, first 
differences in the EFI and average median voter positions were taken.  First differences 
in voter positions are used because percentage changes prove problematic when scores 
                                                 
8 Please see the appendix for a full listing of issue categories.  The delineation of economically relevant and 
non-relevant categories is slightly problematic.  The “Economic Incentives” category is described as “Need 
for wage and tax policies to induce enterprise; encouragement to start enterprises; need for financial and 
other incentives such as subsidies.”  The measure was included on the pro-economic freedom side as it 
seemed most likely that the first two parts of the description would map into reduced business taxation and 
reduced labour market restrictions, and would outweigh the third, anti-market, component.  The regression 
results in Table 2 were replicated using a measure of net pro-market statements that excluded the 
“Economic Incentives” category.  Results proved robust to this change.  Significance levels dropped 
slightly with the modified measure of voter preferences, as would be expected if omitting the category 
provided a worse proxy for voter preferences. 
9 Mean voter positions, simply being the sum of the vote share for each party multiplied by that party’s net 
policy position [ Mean voter position = Σ(vote share party i * position of party i) ], were also constructed.  
In no regression did mean voter position provide a better predictor of policy outcomes than median voter 
position. 
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fall in the interval [-1, 1] too frequently: a change in median voter position from any 
number to 0.2, for example, is grossly inflated.10  An integer year dummy variable was 
added to allow for a time trend.  
III.  Estimation and Regression Results 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆ Freedom 146 0.190 0.682 -2.243 2.346 
Initial Freedom 146 6.916 1.513 3.115 9.077 
Initial Preference 146 -5.283 5.975 -22.220 4.858 
∆ Freedom Preference 146 0.709 5.655 -14.602 19.4407 
Initial Conservatism 146 -4.476 9.683 -39.585 10.080 
∆ Conservatism 146 1.449 7.873 -26.413 48.462 
Initial Right-Left 146 -9.683 12.308 -44.475 9.844 
∆ Right-Left 146 2.197 10.960 -42.686 48.113 
 
 We seek to explain changes in economic freedom over time.  As such, the first 
difference in economic freedom scores (∆ Freedom) is taken as the dependent variable.  
Summary statistics are provided in Table 1, above.  The first series of regressions, 
reported in Table 2, below, conduct simple tests of the relationship between voter 
preferences and economic freedom.  In Regression 1, Economic Freedom in 1970 (Initial 
Freedom) and a year variable are the only independent variables.  Initial levels of 
economic freedom were included to account for convergence: highly-ranked countries 
have less “room to improve” than do more benighted regimes.   In Regression 2, average 
median voter position over economic freedom in the five years prior to 1970 (Initial 
Preference) and first differences in average median voter positions (∆ Freedom 
Preference) are added to the right hand side of the equation.  In Regression 3, average 
median voter preferences over non-economic components of the right-left index in 1970 
                                                 
10 Specifications using percentage changes were also run; results proved moderately robust to the changes: 
while coefficient signs did not change, significance levels dropped substantially. 
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(Initial Conservatism) and first differences in those preferences (∆ Conservatism) are 
added as explanatory variables.  In each of these three, OLS regression with robust 
standard errors for clustering around countries was used.11  Regression 4 uses country 
fixed effect estimation with each of the time-varying variables listed above.  Regressions 
5 and 6 replicate Regressions 2 and 4 but use the aggregate right-left measure of voter 
preferences (Right-Left) as explanatory variable rather than the disaggregated economic  
freedom and conservatism measures. 
                                                 
Table 2: Economic Freedom and Voter Preferences.   
Dependent Variable: ∆ Freedom. 
 Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6 
Initial Freedom -0.127 -0.127 -0.118  -0.118  
 7.3††† 6.34††† 8.43†††  7.52†††  
Initial Preference  0.005 0.005    
  2.00† 1.65    
∆ Freedom Preference  0.025 0.022 0.023   
  2.94††† 2.67†† 2.30††   
Initial Conservatism   -0.002    
   0.85    
∆ Conservatism   0.013 0.013   
   1.47 1.79†   
Initial Right-Left     -0.000  
     0.30  
∆ Right-Left     0.012 0.013 
     2.15†† 2.47†† 
Year 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.025 
 4.84††† 4.65††† 4.78††† 3.79††† 4.91††† 3.79††† 
Constant 0.474 0.481 0.389 -0.438 0.370 -0.440 
 2.31†† 2.18†† 2.30†† 2.64††† 2.10†† 2.62†† 
N 146 146 146 146* 146 146* 
R2 0.179 0.2202 0.2429 0.1730** 0.2173 0.1477*** 
P>F 0 0 0 0 0 0.0001 
* (25 groups, avg 5.8 obs/group, max 6, min 4) **(within = .1745, between = .0.2204) ***(within = 0.145, between = 0.316) 
Note: coefficient estimates are followed by robust t statistics.  
† denotes significance at the 10% level; †† denotes the 5% significance level; ††† denotes the 1% significance level. 
11 These specifications were also estimated by least absolute deviations and proved robust to the alternative 
estimation technique, though the time trend becomes insignificant using this method. 
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In all specifications, initial levels of economic freedom enter significantly and 
negatively.  Countries that were freer in 1970 showed lower increases in economic 
freedom than lower-ranked countries; countries ranked highly in 1970 had little upward 
room to move.  Stronger baseline preferences for economic freedom result in larger 
increases in economic freedom, though the measure is rarely statistically significant.  
Baseline Conservatism, however, does not significantly affect a country’s economic 
freedom.  Changes in Conservatism measure have some predictive power in fixed effects 
estimation of changes in economic freedom.  The time trend proves positive and 
significant in all specifications; economic freedom increased overall in the sample of 
countries examined, for reasons not captured in the other independent variables.  
Changes in preferences for economic freedom prove significant in all 
specifications.  Evaluating at sample means12, a standard deviation increase in median 
voter preference for economic freedom yields a 0.21 standard deviation increased change 
in economic freedom – the expected change in economic freedom rises from 0.19 to 0.33.  
Specifications using the disaggregated Freedom Preference measure have slightly more 
predictive power than specifications using the Right-Left measure.   
It seems clear that changes in voter preferences lead to changes in economic 
freedom outcomes.  I move on to examine whether these results are robust to the addition 
of the institutional variables suggested by La Porta et. al. (2002), who find supreme court 
tenure, administrative court tenure, power of administrative law judges over the 
executive, case law, constitutional rigidity, judicial review, federalism, and legal origin to 
be significant determinants of economic freedom in a cross-section of countries.   
                                                 
12 Using results from Specification 2 
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Table 3 Voter Preferences, Economic Freedom, and Legal Institutions.   
Dependent Variable: ∆ Freedom 
 Initial 
Freedom 
Initial 
Preference 
∆ Freedom 
Preference Institution 
Institution *  
∆ Freedom 
Preference N R2 
-0.127 0.005 0.025     No institution 
6.34††† 2.00† 2.94†††   146 0.220 
-0.126 0.007 0.028 -0.052 -0.007   German Legal 
Origin 5.45††† 1.88† 2.17†† 1.77† 0.54 140 0.223 
-0.127 0.004 0.031 0.013 -0.018   Scandinavian 
Leg. Or. 5.55††† 0.97 3.59††† 0.38 1.06 140 0.227 
-0.130 0.006 0.025 0.080 0.003   English Legal 
Origin 5.51††† 1.67 2.33†† 1.72† 0.21 140 0.225 
-0.130 0.005 0.020 -0.068 0.035   French Legal 
Origin 5.47††† 1.90† 2.48†† 1.51 1.29 140 0.234 
-0.128 0.005 0.025 0.007    Supreme Court 
Tenure 5.59††† 1.80 2.87††† 0.21  140 0.222 
-0.127 0.003 0.081 -0.016 -0.032   Administrative 
Court Tenure 6.01††† 1.20 2.49†† 0.24 1.87† ‡ 140 0.241 
-0.139 0.005 0.026 0.082    S.C. Control over 
A.C. 5.63††† 1.72† 2.89††† 1.92†  140 0.224 
-0.135 0.006 0.026 0.068    A.C. power over 
Executive 5.70††† 1.87† 2.90††† 1.78†  140 0.224 
-0.125 0.006 0.045 0.088 -0.024   Case Law 
5.75††† 1.98†† 2.30†† 2.65†† 1.14‡ 140 0.231 
-0.123 0.005 0.025 -0.023    Constitutional 
Rigidity 5.14††† 1.67 2.87††† 0.76  140 0.222 
-0.128 0.005 0.025 -0.006    Judiciary Review 
5.60††† 1.76† 2.86††† 0.21  140 0.222 
-0.124 0.005 0.023 -0.026 0.010   Federal System 
4.48††† 1.62 2.12†† 0.49 0.76 140 0.223 
Notes: all specifications include the Year variable (not reported).  Each row reports results from separate specifications 
where each institutional variable is tested in turn. Coefficient estimates are followed by robust t statistics. 
† denotes significance at the 10% level; †† denotes the 5% significance level; ††† denotes the 1% significance level.   
‡ denotes that the interaction term correlates with ∆ Freedom at 0.70 or higher.  The interaction term is not dropped in 
these two cases of high correlation as it does not unduly magnify the standard error of ∆ Freedom.   
 
Regression 2, reported in Table 2, was re-run sequentially adding each of the La 
Porta variables in turn.  Where La Porta tests the effect of these institutions on levels of 
economic freedom in a cross-section of countries, I test the effects of these variables on 
changes in economic freedom.  Changes in median voter preferences translate into 
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changes in economic freedom outcomes only as mediated by these institutions; 
consequently, interactions between the ∆ Freedom Preference and each institutional 
variable are also tested.  The results are reported in Table 3, above. 
The first important result is the overwhelming robustness of the ∆ Freedom 
Preference variable.  It remains significant at the 1% level and the coefficient remains 
quite stable in the majority of specifications.  Exceptions occur when the interaction term 
is highly collinear with the ∆ Freedom Preference measure.  In most cases where the 
interaction term correlated with the ∆ Freedom Preference measure at 0.70 or higher, the 
typical effects of collinearity were evidenced.  The interaction term was dropped in those 
specifications where it correlated strongly with the voter preference term and where the 
voter preference term and the interaction term showed inflated standard errors. 
The variables that La Porta finds significant in determining levels of economic 
freedom prove less significant in determining changes in economic freedom.  Four of 
these variables prove significant and have the expected sign, one is significant but with 
the opposite sign, one is statistically insignificant but has the expected sign, and five are 
insignificant and have the opposite sign.  English Legal Origin, Supreme Court Control 
over Administrative Courts, Administrative Court Power over Executive and Case Law 
prove significant in increasing economic freedom over time.   
Interaction effects generally proved insignificant, and many of the interaction 
terms correlated too strongly with the ∆ Freedom Preference measure to provide 
meaningful results.13  A negative coefficient indicates that the institution tends to mute 
the effects of changes in voter preferences while a positive coefficient suggests that the 
                                                 
13 The interaction of Constitutional Rigidity and ∆ Freedom Preference correlates with ∆ Freedom 
Preference at 0.9438, for example. 
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institution tends to amplify changes in voter sentiment.  Only the Administrative Court 
Tenure variable proves statistically significant in interaction with ∆ Freedom Preference; 
longer administrative court tenure reduces the effect of changes in voter preferences on 
economic freedom outcomes. 
The institutions listed by La Porta et. al. may be important in determining overall 
levels of economic freedom, but do relatively little to explain changes in economic 
freedom over time.  Only the Case Law variable proves significant at anything more than 
the ten percent level.  And, importantly, the political institutions tested seem to do little 
either to augment or to mitigate the effects of changes in popular sentiment; when they 
can be tested, the interaction effects are statistically insignificant.   
Electoral institutions seem another plausible mechanism by which voter 
preferences are translated into political outcomes.  Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) 
find that electoral mechanisms correlate with policy outcomes.  In particular, they find 
that presidential regimes enjoy smaller governments than parliamentary regimes.  Beck 
et. al. (2001) provide a useful database of worldwide political institutions.  As the 
Database of Political provides observations for 1975 to 1997, I truncate my dataset to 
eliminate observations from 1999.  Results of specifications incorporating electoral 
institutions are reported in Table 4, below. 
None of the institutional terms tested prove significant in explaining changes in 
economic freedom, either alone or in interaction with the ∆ Freedom Preference measure.  
As was the case in Table 3, interaction terms correlating strongly with the voter 
preference measure and causing collinearity problems were dropped.  Electoral 
institutions seem not to affect changes in economic freedom scores.  More careful 
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analysis of these results is warranted however; in particular, alternate methods should be 
explored to resolve the collinearity problems encountered in these specifications. 
Table 4: Voter Preferences, Economic Freedom, and Political Institutions.   
Dependent Variable: ∆ Freedom 
 
Initial 
Freedom 
Initial 
Preference 
∆ Freedom 
Preference Institution 
Institution *  
∆ Freedom 
Preference N R2 
-0.145 0.004 0.037     
No institution 4.03††† 0.42 3.65†††   121 0.396 
-0.138 0.001 0.035 0.265 0.077   Presidential 
System 3.84††† 0.16 3.36††† 0.99 1.10 121 0.415 
-0.150 0.005 0.037 -0.178 0.209   Assembly-elected 
President 4.13††† 0.56 3.58††† 0.24 0.54 121 0.405 
-0.137 0.002 0.147 -0.078 -0.113   Parliamentary 
System 3.83††† 0.27 2.37†† 0.35 1.80†‡ 121 0.416 
-0.153 0.003 0.037 0.030    
Plurality System 3.90††† 0.36 3.60††† 0.26  121 0.398 
-0.152 0.004 0.037 0.049    Proportional 
Representation 3.93††† 0.41 3.58††† 0.35  121 0.398 
Note: all specifications include the Year variable (not reported).  Each row reports results from separate specifications 
where each institutional variable is tested in turn. Coefficient estimates are followed by standard t statistics. 
† denotes significance at the 10% level; †† denotes the 5% significance level; ††† denotes the 1% significance level. 
‡ denotes that the interaction term correlates with ∆ Freedom at 0.70 or higher.  The interaction term is not dropped in this 
case of high correlation as it does not unduly magnify the standard error of ∆ Freedom.   
 
 
The ∆ Freedom Preference measure proved quite robust to alternate institutional 
specifications and to the truncation of post-1997 observations.  It remained very stable 
and highly significant in all specifications tested, with the exception of those in which it 
was strongly collinear with an interaction term.  Changes in voter preferences for 
economic freedom prove an important determinant of changes in economic freedom 
rankings. 
IV.  Conclusions and directions for future research. 
 
 Economic freedom correlates with desirable outcomes on several dimensions, 
including per capita GDP, economic growth, poverty abatement, human development, 
literacy and life expectancy.  Given the beneficent effects of economic freedom, we 
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should expect that many studies examine the causes of economic freedom.  While several 
studies have examined economic freedom in cross-sections of countries, there has been 
relative little work examining changes in economic freedom over time.   
This paper provides an initial exploration of the determinants of changes in 
economic freedom over time in the developed world.  I construct a panel measure of 
voter preferences for economic freedom and find that changes in my measure of voter 
preference correlates strongly with changes in economic freedom.  These results are 
robust to multiple specifications, estimation techniques, and varying institutional control 
variables. 
These results are, of course, rather preliminary and many avenues remain to be 
explored.  Other variables, including the cultural variables examined by Norton, have 
been identified as contributing to economic freedom and should be tested against the 
voter preference measure.  Further institutional variables need to be tested, and more 
refined estimation techniques should be applied.  Examination of the causes of changes in 
economic freedom remains an area almost wholly open for new study.   
 While keeping in mind that much work remains to be done, these preliminary 
results are rather striking.  Voter preferences matter greatly.  Increasing economic 
freedom, and thereby achieving the beneficial outcomes identified by Grubel and others, 
depends in no small part on changing voter attitudes towards economic freedom.     
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Appendix 
 
Issue Categories included in Budge et. al. 
Foreign Special Relationships: Positive Productivity 
Foreign Special Relationships: Negative Technology and Infrastructure 
Anti-Imperialism Controlled Economy 
Military: Positive Nationalisation 
Military: Negative Economic Orthodoxy 
Peace Marxist Analysis 
Internationalism: Positive Anti-Growth Economy 
European Community: Positive Environmental Protection 
Internationalism: Negative Culture 
European Community: Negative Social Justice 
Freedom and Human Rights Welfare State Expansion 
Democracy Welfare State Limitation 
Constitutionalism: Positive Education Expansion 
Constitutionalism: Negative Education Limitation 
Decentralisation National way of life: Positive 
Centralisation National Way of Life: Negative 
Governmental & Administrative Efficiency Traditional Morality: Positive 
Political Corruption Traditional Morality: Negative 
Political Authority Law and Order 
Free Enterprise Social Harmony 
Incentives Multiculturalism: Positive 
Market Regulation Multiculturalism: Negative 
Economic Planning  Labour Groups: Positive 
Corporatism Labour Groups: Negative 
Protectionism: Positive Agriculture and Farmers 
Protectionism: Negative Middle Class and Professional Groups 
Economic Goals Underprivileged Minority Groups 
Keynesian Demand Management Non-economic demographic groups 
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Right/Left Issue Categories 
RIGHT LEFT 
Military: Positive Anti-Imperialism 
Freedom and Human Rights Military: Negative 
Constitutionalism: Positive Peace 
Political Authority Internationalism: Positive 
Free Enterprise Market Regulation 
Incentives Economic Planning  
Protectionism: Negative Protectionism: Positive 
Economic Orthodoxy Controlled Economy 
Welfare State Limitation Nationalisation 
National way of life: Positive Welfare State Expansion 
Traditional Morality: Positive Education Expansion 
Law and Order Labour Groups: Positive 
Social Harmony Democracy 
 
 
 
Economic Freedom Right/Left categories 
RIGHT: PRO MARKET LEFT: PRO-GOVERNMENT 
Free Enterprise Market Regulation 
Incentives Economic Planning 
Protectionism: Negative Protectionism: Positive 
Economic Orthodoxy Controlled Economy 
Welfare State Limitation Welfare State Expansion 
 Nationalisation 
 
Countries included in the Manifesto data set: 
Australia (1946-1998, 22 elections) Japan (1960-1996, 13 elections) 
Austria (1949-1995, 15 elections) Luxembourg (1945-1994, 12 elections) 
Belgium (1946-1995, 17 elections) The Netherlands (1946-1998, 16 elections) 
Canada (1945-1997, 17 elections) New Zealand (1946-1996, 18 elections) 
Denmark (1945-1998, 22 elections) Norway (1945-1997, 14 elections) 
Finland (1945-1995, 15 elections) Portugal (1975-1995, 9 elections) 
France (1946-1997, 14 elections) Spain (1977 – 1996, 7 elections) 
Germany (1949-1998, 14 elections) Sweden (1948-1998, 17 elections) 
Greece (1974-1996, 9 elections) Switzerland (1947-1995, 13 elections) 
Iceland (1946-1995, 16 elections) Turkey (1950-1995, 12 elections) 
Ireland (1948-1997, 16 elections) Great Britain (1945-1997, 15 elections) 
Israel (1949-1996, 14 elections) United States (1948-1996, 13 elections) 
Italy (1946-1996, 14 elections)  
 
 17 
Electoral Determinants of Economic Freedom    Eric Crampton 
References 
 
Ali, Abdiweli M. 1997. “Economic Freedom, Democracy and Growth.” Journal of 
Private Enterprise 13 (Fall): 1-20. 
 
Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer and Patrick Walsh.  2001.  
“New tools in comparative political economy: The Database of Political 
Institutions.”  World Bank Economic Review, 15:1 (September), 165-76. 
 
Budge, Ian.  1999.  “Estimating Party Policy Positions: From Ad Hoc Measures to 
Theoretically Validated Standards.”  Workshop paper presentation at the Joint 
Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research, Workshop #5: 
“Estimating the policy positions of political actors”.  
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/jointsessions/Manpapers/w5/w5home.htm 
 
Budge, Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, and Eric 
Tanenbaum, (eds.), 2001.  Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, 
Electors, and Governments 1945-1998.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Castles, F. G. and P. Mair.  1984.  “Left-right political scales: Some ‘expert’ judgments”, 
European Journal of Political Research 12: 73-88. 
 
Caudill, Steven B., Fernando C. Zanella and Franklin G. Mixon, Jr., 2000.  “Is Economic 
Freedom One Dimensional?  A Factor Analysis of Some Common Measures of 
Economic Freedom”, Journal of Economic Development, 25:1 (June), 17-40 
 
Dawson, John W., 1998.  “Institutions, Investment, and Growth: New Cross-Country and 
Panel Data Evidence”, Economic Inquiry, 36 (October), 603-19. 
 
De Haan, Jakob and Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2000a.  “On the Relationship between Economic 
Freedom and Economic Growth”, European Journal of Political Economy, 16:2 
(June), 215-41. 
 
De Haan, Jakob and Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2000b.  “Does more democracy lead to greater 
economic freedom?  New evidence for developing countries”, working paper. 
 
De Haan, Jakob and Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2001.  “How Robust is the Relationship between 
Economic Freedom and Economic Growth?”, Applied Economics, 33:7 (June), 
839-44. 
 
De Soto, Hernando.  2000.  The Mystery of Capital.  New York, Basic Books. 
 
Easton, Steven T., and Michael A. Walker (1997). “Income, Growth, and Economic 
Freedom”, American Economic Review 87:2 (May), 328-32. 
 
 18 
Electoral Determinants of Economic Freedom    Eric Crampton 
Grubel, Herbert G., 1998.  “Economic Freedom and Human Welfare: Some Empirical 
Findings”, Cato Journal, 18:2 (Fall), 287-304. 
 
Gwartney, James D., Robert A. Lawson, and Randall G. Holcombe, 1999.  “Economic 
Freedom and the Environment for Economic Growth”, Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics, 155:4 (December) 643-63. 
 
Gwartney, James D., Robert A. Lawson, 2001.  “Economic Freedom of the World 2001 
Annual Report”.  Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser Institute. 
 
Heckelman, Jac C.,  2000.  “Economic Freedom and Economic Growth: A Short-Run 
Causal Investigation”, Journal of Applied Economics, 3:1 (May), 71-91. 
 
Hofferbert, Richard I. and Ian Budge.  1992.  “Party Mandate and the Westminster 
Model: Election Programmes and Government Spending in Britain, 1948-85”, 
British Journal of Political Science, 22:3 (April) 151-82. 
 
Kim, Hee-Min and Richard C. Fording. 1998.  “Voter Ideology in Western Democracies, 
1946-1989”, European Journal of Political Research, 33: 73-97. 
 
Kim, Hee-Min and Richard C. Fording.  2001a. “Extending Party Estimates to 
Governments and Electors”, pp.157-177 (Chapter 8) in Budge et al., 2001. 
 
Kim, Hee-Min and Richard C. Fording.  2001b.  “Voter Ideology, the Economy, and the 
International Environment in Western Democracies, 1952-1989”, Political 
Behavior 23:1 (March) 120-40. 
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Christian Pop-Eleeches, and Andrei 
Shleifer, 2002.  “The Guarantees of Freedom”, working paper.  Available at 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/laporta/papers/freedom.pdf 
 
Laver, Michael and Ian Budge, (ed.).  1992.  Party Policy and Government Coalitions.  
London: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Laver, Michael and Ian Budge.  1993.  Party Policy and Coalition Government in 
Western Europe.  London: Macmillan. 
 
Laver, Michael and John Garry.  2000.  “Estimating Policy Positions from Political 
Texts”, American Journal of Political Science 44:3 (July) 619-34. 
 
Norton, Seth W.  2002.  “Ethnicity, Religion, and Aggregate Property Rights: A Cross-
National Study”, working paper.  Available at www.isnie.org/ISNIE98/Norton.doc 
 
Stevenson, Randolph T.  2001.  “The Economy and Policy Mood: A Fundamental 
Dynamic of Democratic Politics?”, American Journal of Political Science, 45: 
620-33. 
 
 19 
Electoral Determinants of Economic Freedom    Eric Crampton 
Stimson, J.A.  1991.  Public Opinion in America: Moods, cycles, and swings.  Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press. 
 20 
